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Article 155 CE, if activated, would have offered to the Spanish government a legal tool to take control of Catalan
institutions on the terms decided by the Senate after a public debate. Article 116 CE, if activated after a debate in
Congress in a situation of violence that could create a risk for public services or a sufficiently serious threat to public
order, is to be used in order to limit fundamental rights, invoking a state of emergency.
Lacking legitimacy in Catalonia because of the absence of solutions to Catalan democratic claims within the Spanish
legal framework, the position of Spanish institutions is badly weakened. Therefore, they do not to want to take the
risk of creating even more political unrest in Catalonia with public and explicit debates on the suspension of
autonomy or on the necessity of limiting fundamental rights. Instead, Spanish government is pushing other
institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, prosecutors, police and judges, as well as their own executive powers,
beyond their ordinary limits.
There is already an increasing list of abnormal situations that are creating deep concern among some Spanish legal
scholars and civil servants and getting more and more attention among European media and European Union
institutions. The logic followed in all these cases is the same: The Spanish government wants something to be done
that could have been easily obtained throughout arts. 155 CE or 116 CE but do not want to pay the political costs of
doing it openly and with public debate and democratic control. Therefore, Spanish authorities go ahead using
alternative ways to achieve their goals, at the cost of distorting some procedures or institutions or posing
fundamental rights at risk. Here is a provisional quick list of some of the most blatant examples:
The position of the Spanish Constitutional Court has been reshaped with the only intention of avoiding the
political costs for government of invoking art. 155 CE. A new bill passed in 2015 granted special executive
powers to the Constitutional Court that should be used in order to have more means to secure full allegiance
to its decisions. Those special powers allow a provisional suspension of non law-abiding public authorities
and other ways to put pressure on them. For the Spanish government, it is a very suitable solution: instead of
art. 155 CE, it can just ask the Constitutional Court to act against the concerned authorities. However, for the
Constitutional Court, the exercise of these powers could compromise its position. As not only the Venice
Commission of the European Council but also a minority of Spanish constitutional judges in their dissents
have pointed out, to have and to use these powers risks to reshape the institution, changing its nature from a
neutral referee to an agent of execution used at the pleasure of the Spanish Government. For the moment,
these exceptional powers have been already used in order to suspend the electoral authorities appointed by
the Catalan authorities, in an unanimously voted ruling (although with the caveats and deep concern
expressed by three constitutional judges).
Freedom of speech and assembly and other fundamental rights are under big pressure right now in Spain.
Prosecutors (which in Spain are under hierarchical control by the General Prosecutor, who is directly
appointed by the Government) and administrative bodies controlled by the State are taking to court or directly
prohibiting political meetings, the printing and posting of political publicity and even political debates related
not only to the illegal referendum but to more general subjects that could be linked to it. Lately, a dozen of web
pages from private secessionist associations have been directly shut down by administrative decision. Most
judges, under big political, social and journalistic pressure, are accepting to suspend such meetings and also
seem to support the view that considers illegal the display of any printed materials related to the
referendum..They are even giving their authorization to prosecute private citizens creating “mirror webpages”
1/3
from the ones created by the Catalan government to give information on the vote. Publicly owned companies,
like the Spanish postal service, are controlling the mail in order to prevent the delivery of any information or
publicity related to the referendum. All those cases have, obviously, in common the dangerous restriction of
basic fundamental rights, altering the traditional case-law of the Spanish Constitutional Court, which have
always accepted that Spain is not a “militant democracy”, having proclaimed it time and again, even in its
former decisions against the Catalan referendum. The very essential idea that public discussion of those
issues should be preserved in any case has come under heavy pressure in Spain.
The Spanish government has been using financial tools and regulations on budgetary stability derived from
European directives to gain political control over any decision of Catalan authorities that requires public
funding. These legal tools, which have the capacity of effectively limiting autonomy to a great extent, had
been accepted by the Spanish Constitutional Court, but only as a way to assure budgetary stability. Misuse of
those powers is in clear breach with the Spanish legality, and a gross example of the classical figure of
“détournement de pouvoir”.  It also shows in a disturbing manner how readily the Spanish government is
willing to abuse its powers and how fragile the real substance of autonomy in Spain may be.
A similar distortion has been created with Catalan security forces and police bodies, which State authorities,
using the Public Prosecutor Office, have tried to bring under State control ignoring Spanish legality and the
normal distribution of jurisdiction between the different police bodies.
Last but not least, it has to be said that State prosecutors are dangerously expanding the scope of some
criminal offenses, prosecuting private citizens because of crimes that are supposed to be committed only by
civil servants or public authorities, relaxing the specificity of the legality principle and even claiming that some
crimes such as rebellion or similar offenses could be punished even without a violent uprising (against the
general practice in Europe, but also in contradiction with the reform of the Spanish Criminal Code made in
Spain five years ago with the explicit intention of excluding the possibility of prosecution for those claims
without the existence of an effective violent revolt). For the moment, this is just the position of the General
Prosecutor. It remains to be seen if any courts will uphold it, and there are good reasons to hope they will not.
Nevertheless, the mere fact of seeing the Spanish government and prosecutors pushing in that direction is
worrying enough.
In each of the cases listed, State officials claim that an exceptional expansion of the boundaries of administrative or
judicial capacities is fully warranted because of the seriousness of the situation in Catalonia. A growing number of
legal scholars claim that in order to produce such results the only admissible constitutional way should be to activate
art. 155 CE. Legal attrition to fundamental rights and to the criminal legality principle are also seen with big concern,
at least in some circles. Furthermore, there are some political groups denouncing this situation, mostly from the
radical left (Podemos) and parties from the Basque Country, the Balearic Islands, Galicia or the region of Valencia.
For the time being, though, public opinion in Spain tends to approve this reaction. Spanish media outlets, for
example, have shown a steady solid support to the Spanish government, with only marginal exceptions, in sharp
contrast with the conflicted vision offered by the European press.
This depiction of general conformity with the Government’s reaction hardly applies to Catalonia, though. The social
and political divide between Catalonia and rest of Spain has been made even bigger because of recent events. We
cannot know if the use of that kind of tools may be increased or decreased in next weeks. We do not know the plans
of the Spanish government about the use of art. 155 CE. However, we do know for sure that the use of coercive
power is not going to solve the Catalan problem, which is a political one. Sooner or later, the Spanish legal system,
i.e. the Spanish Constitution, will have to offer a legal path to allow the normal expression of the democratic wishes
of the Catalan people. If not, the situation simply cannot be solved, and it will create more social conflicts, maybe
even deeper ones.  Spain should have no interest in inflicting such damage on itself. Neither the European Union,
for obvious reasons.
Therefore, the solution to the current Spanish Constitutional Crisis would require, in any case, a significant softening
of the rigid understanding of the unity principle of the Spanish Constitution. That is the key point. How to do it, by the
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way, is not so essential. In fact, it is possible to achieve that goal with a mere change in the common interpretation
of the Constitution reflected in the Constitutional Court case law, only by accepting the possibility of an agreement
on a referendum, for instance implemented with specific legislation as it was suggested years ago by Rubio
Llorente. Obviously, it is also possible to amend the Spanish Constitution to make things even easier and clearer. It
might be enough to accept a de facto politically valid referendum. But advancing in that direction is essential in order
to solve the current constitutional crisis in Spain. If not, pursuing only the sort of remedies that we have seen for the
moment coming from the Spanish government, this Constitutional Crisis will continue, the conflict of legitimacies will
keep going and widen, and at the end the already existing breach between Catalonia and the rest of Spain might
turn into something really horrible.
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